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Executory Labor Contracts and
Municipal Bankruptcy
New York City's fiscal crisis" and Congress's subsequent revision of
Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act2 have raised questions about the
status of labor contracts in a municipal bankruptcy. Under what con-
ditions, if any, can municipal employee contracts be rejected in bank-
ruptcy? After rejecting a contract, can a city unilaterally institute
revised terms of employment, to stay in effect until a new contract is
signed? This Note examines the likely impact of the new provisions
concerning municipal employee contracts and analyzes several con-
tradictions between the understanding of the House and the Senate as
to the working of the new Chapter IX.
I. New York City nearly defaulted on the repayment of its bonded debt in October,
1975. For discussion of New York's financial crisis, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1975, § 4, at
1, col. 3; id., Oct. 18, 1975, § 1, at I, col. 8; Bus. WEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 51, 53; H.R. REP.
No. 94-632, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 2-9, 49-53 (1975).
2. Repealed Chapter IX, governing compositions of municipal indebtedness, is pres-
ently codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1970). It was superseded this year by the Act of
April 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (90 Stat. 315-25) (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-418). Hereinafter, references to the revised version will be
to the section number of the new Act only. Before the latest amendments, the capacity
of Chapter IX to relieve the financial difficulties of large cities had been questioned. E.g.,
Note, Reforn of Creditor Participation Procedures in Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J.
423 (1976). (Municipal corporations are denied relief under other chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. §§ 22(a), 506(3), 506(5), 706(3) (1970).)
Comprehensive revision of the entire Bankruptcy Act, including Chapter IX, has been
under active consideration since January, 1975. See, e.g., H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). New York City's fiscal crisis caused Congress
to accelerate its consideration of the municipal bankruptcy proposals, and several bills
dealing exclusively with municipal bankruptcy were introduced. The House bill, H.R.
10624, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), was reported in H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The Senate bill, S. 2597, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), substantially similar to the House bill, was reported in S. REP. No. 94-
458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. An amended
version of H.R. 10624 was reported by the House-Senate Conference in H.R. REP. No.
94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. It was
agreed to by both Houses of Congress on Mar. 25, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. H2384, S4378
(daily ed., Mar. 25, 1976), and was signed into law in April.
Under revised Chapter IX, a municipality files a petition in federal court alleging
insolvency. § 84. Filing of a petition acts as an automatic stay of all suits against the
city, § 85(e), affording time for orderly negotiation of a plan to adjust the city's debts,
§ 91. The court classifies the city's creditors according to the nature of their claims
(e.g., secured or unsecured). § 88(b). This classification scheme determines the order in
which creditors are paid under the plan. Each class of creditors must approve the plan
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I. Procedures for Rejection of Labor Contracts in
Municipal Bankruptcy
Collective bargaining contracts are executory insofar as the obliga-
tions of both parties remain substantially unperformed. 3 Bankrupts
in the private sector long have been empowered to reject executory
contracts that are onerous or burdensome to the estate,4 including in
some circumstances collective bargaining agreements.5 The new legisla-
tion makes this power plainly available to municipal debtors for the
first time.6 Although the statute does not refer to municipal employee
contracts, the accompanying House and Senate Reports agree that these
contracts are subject to rejection3
by a vote of two-thirds in amount and a majority in number of claims voted, unless the
court finds that the plan compensates the class adequately. § 92. The court will confirm
a plan that is fair and equitable, § 94(b), discharging the city from its debts, § 95(b).
For a general discussion of the provisions of the new municipal bankruptcy legislation,
see HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 6-14.
3. "Executory contract" is not defined in the old Bankruptcy Act nor in the Act as
amended, but the SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15, construes the term broadly: "The
Committee contemplates that all continuing obligations of the petitioner will be con-
sidered executory contracts, including collective bargaining agreements." Accord, HousE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 57 (Supplemental Views). Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973), defines the term as a contract
under which the obligations of both parties "are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the per-
formance of the other."
As of the date of filing of a Chapter IX petition, a municipal employee contract is
executory over its remaining life. The contract is not executory with respect to claims for
past wages, since employees will have fully discharged the contractual duties which
created the claims. See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part If, 58
MINN. L. REv. 479, 480 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Countryman, Part II]. A municipality's
assumption or rejection of a labor contract thus will have no effect on claims for pre.
filing wages. Those claims will be adjusted in accordance with the newly established
wage priority. (The new legislation establishes three types of "priority" expenses, § 89,
which must be paid in full before any distributions to creditors are made under the
plan. The first, or highest, priority is for administrative expenses-costs incurred in
running the city after the filing date as well as costs of the bankruptcy proceeding itself.
The second priority covers services and materials provided to the city within three
months before filing, including workers' wages and fringe benefits. The third priority is
for debts to the federal government.)
4. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970) (straight bankruptcy); id. § 205(b) (railroad reorganiza-
tion); id. §§ 516(1), 616(4) (Chap. X reorganization); id. §§ 713(l), 757(2) (Chap. XI
arrangement).
5. See Brotherhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); C. MoRRIs, THE DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAW 817-18 (1971); Countryman, Part II, supra note 3, at 492-98.
6. §§ 82(b)(1), 91. The HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, observes that the power to
reject executory contracts "had not previously been granted under Chapter IX." Section
83(a) of repealed Chapter IX, 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970), may have provided a possible
vehicle for rejection: a city's plan of composition could contain "such other provisions
and agreements not inconsistent with [Chapter IX] as the parties may desire." But no
case has been reported in which a municipal debtor used this provision to reject an
executory contract through its plan.
7. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, 17; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. The
Act and accompanying reports do not define the power of rejection. Where legislative
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The statute offers two procedures for rejecting executory contracts.
The first procedure (§ 91 rejection)s uses as a mechanism the plan of
adjustment approved at the end of any successful Chapter IX proceed-
ing. A city must submit a plan for the adjustment of its debts at the
time it files a Chapter IX petition, or at some time after filing, as the
court directs.9 This plan may include provisions modifying the rights
of creditors generally, and "such other provisions and agreements not
inconsistent with [Chapter IX] as the parties may desire, including
provisions for the rejection of any executory contract or unexpired
lease."' 10 The "parties," in the case of a municipal employee contract,
include at least the union and the city;" the plan of adjustment thus
cannot provide for rejection of a labor contract unless the union
"desires" it.12 In addition, the court, after a hearing, must approve the
history is thus silent, this Note will draw upon the standards evolved in Chapters X and
XI. See HOUSE REPORT, supra at 17 ("The abundant case law surrounding [rejection of
executory contracts] is meant to be incorporated into Chapter IX.")
Under revised Chapter IX, a municipality desiring to reject a collective bargaining
agreement must reject the entire contract and do so explicitly. The city cannot retain
the advantageous features of a contract and cast off the rest. Cf. 6 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTC'Y ' 3.24[l] (14th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; 8 id. ff 3.15[7] (14th ed.
1976) (discussing Chaps. X & XI).
Although the new legislation contains no express provision for assumption of execu-
tory contracts, the power to assume must be implied. Otherwise, a power of rejection
would be meaningless. Cf. 6 id. rf 3.23[5] (Chap. X). Assumption, like rejection, must be
of the entire contract. Cf. 6 id. f 3.24[2] (Chap. X); 8 id. r 3.15[6] (Chap. XI). Assumption
must be explicit and must have judicial sanction before becoming effective. Cf. id.
r 3.23[5] (Chap. X); In re Schenectady Ry., 93 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (tacit ac-
ceptance of labor contract does not constitute assumption). But see In re Public Ledger,
Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947), rev'g 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (knowing con-
formity to terms of labor contract constitutes assumption, even without judicial ap-
prolal). In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, assumption of a contract would
bar later rejection. Cf. 6 COLLIER, supra e 3.24[2) (Chap. X); 9 id. jf 8.27 (14th ed. 1975)
(Chap. XI). Expenses under an assumed labor contract would be first priority expenses of





11. The term "parties" does not seem to be confined to those signatory to the ex-
ecutory contract.,The language of 11 U.S.C. § 403 (1970), predecessor to § 91, used the
term "parties" without mentioning either executory contracts or leases. See note 6 supra.
In addition, the new law elsewhere uses the more explicit term "parties to such contracts
[or] leases" to denote the signatories, § 82(b)(1), and uses the term "parties in interest" to
indicate any parties affected by the plan, §§ 82(b)(1), 85(a), 88, 90(b). Parties other than
the union may be interested in preventing rejection of a labor contract. For instance,
unsecured creditors may believe that the union's damage claim arising from rejection,
see pp. 960 61 infra, will so dilute their share of the distributed funds as to disadvantage
them more than would continuation of the old contract.
12. In allowing the other contracting party to block § 91 rejection of an executory
contract, revised Chapter IX differs significantly from Chapters X and XI. Under
Chapter X, a debtor may include in the plan provision for rejection of any executory
contract "except contracts in the public authority." 11 U.S.C. § 616(4) (1970). Under
Chapter XI, "the debtor's right to provide for rejection in his plan is absolute, subject
to confirmation of the plan." 9 COLLIER, supra note 7, ff 8.07, at 181.
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entire plan as "fair and equitable."'13 But it is primarily the require-
ment of union consent which makes this form of rejection impractical.
14
The second procedure (§ 82(b) rejection)"5 allows rejection despite
union opposition and so will be more attractive to most cities wishing
to reject labor contracts. The city may seek judicial approval for rejec-
tion at any time after filing its petition. The court must hold a hearing
concerning rejection, giving notice to the affected municipal union
and to "such other parties in interest as the court may designate."' 0 If
requisite standards for rejection are met,1 7 the court may permit re-
jection even over union opposition since there is no provision requir-
ing the city to obtain consent from other parties. Apparently rejection
is immediately effective and remains so whether or not the plan is
ultimately confirmed.1
8
Rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by either method
constitutes a breach of contract as of the date the Chapter IX petition
was filed, giving rise to a union claim for the full amount of damages
13. § 94(b)(1). The union has the right to intervene in this general hearing, for
rejection gives rise to a damage claim for breach of contract, see pp. 960-61 infra, making
the union a "creditor" within the meaning of § 93. The rejection does not become ef-
fective until the confirmation of the plan, cf. 6 COLLIER, supra note 7, jT 3.2411] (Chap. X);
8 id. f 3.15[9] (Chap. XI), and thus the union's damage claim comes into existence only
upon confirmation. Yet such prospective damage has been deemed sufficient in Chapters
X and XI to render a party to a rejected contract a "creditor," entitling him to voice
objections to and vote on the plan along with other creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 602, 753 (1970);
6 COLL.IER, supra ir 3.23[2], at 565; id. f 3.2, at 583 n.62, 584 n.64 (Chap. X); 9 id. ff 8.05,
at 1071 (Chap. XI).
However, the standard of "fairness and equity" by which the plan as a whole is judged
in the general hearing, § 94(b)(1), may be less exacting in regard to rejection than is the
balancing of equities encompassed in a hearing devoted solely to rejection, such as the
hearing held under § 82(b), see pp. 960, 961-65 infra. The "fair and equitable" standard
embodies the absolute priority rule, requiring full compensation of senior creditors be-
fore any payout is made to junior creditors. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 32. Still, it
also requires "that the plan embody a fair and equitable bargain, openly arrived at and
devoid of overreaching." Id. at 33.
14. A union might consent to rejection through the plan knowing that under the
amended Act the court could authorize unilateral rejection by the city. See discussion
below. If the city provided for rejection in the plan, it would presumably incorporate by
reference its new agreement with the union. See generally HousE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 12. Upon confirmation of the plan, the old contract would lapse and the new agree-
ment automatically take effect.
15. § 82(b)(1).
16. Id. Who the other parties in interest may be is not specified by the Act or by
the accompanying reports. It seems likely that the city's other creditors or their repre-
sentatives are those intended. Cf. 6 COLLIER, supra note 7, C 3.25 (Chap. X); 8 id. 3.16
(Chap. XI).
17. See pp. 961-65 infra. The decision to allow rejection rests in the discretion of the
court. "The court may . . . permit the petitioner to reject executory contracts .... "
§ 82(b) (emphasis added). Cf. 6 COLLIER, supra note 7, 3.23[41 (Chap. X); 8 id. 3.15[131
(Chap. XI).
18. Cf. 6 COLLIER, supra note 7, r 3.24[1] (Chap. X); 8 id. 3.15[9] (Chap. XI).
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gainst the city.19 However, the claim for damages does not rise to the
status of a priority administrative expense and must be dealt with in
the plan. 20 The union participates in the plan merely as an unsecured
general creditor.
21
II. Limitations on the Power to Reject
Municipal Labor Contracts
A. The Standards for Rejection
The new statute is silent regarding the standards which should guide
the court in considering the rejection of executory contracts. The
House Report suggests that standards for rejection of labor contracts
are meant to be considerably more stringent than for rejection of
other executory contracts.22 There are no cases of rejection under the
old Chapter IX to provide guidance;2 3 accordingly the House Report
turns to judicial standards evolved under other chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Chapter X and XI courts generally have permitted rejec-
tion of nonlabor executory contracts upon a showing that the contract
is burdensome and that rejection will aid the petitioner's reorganiza-
tion.24 A debtor under those chapters can gain judicial approval for
rejection merely by demonstrating that rejection would be financially
beneficial.2 But with respect to labor contracts, as the Report notes,
"the courts have taken a slightly different position on the grounds for
19. The Act puts no ceiling on the union's claim for damages resulting from the
breach. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. Cf. 9 COLLIER, supra note 7, ff 7.15[6.2]
(Chap. XI), Compare the explicit limit, of one year's rent plus any unpaid back rent, set
by the Act on a landlord's recovery for breach of an unexpired lease. § 88(c). The
union's unliquidated claim for damages would be filed at a time set by the court.
§ 88(a). The likely measure of the union's damages is the difference in benefits between
the old and new contracts (or between the old contract and the interim terms established
pending renegotiation of a new contract), from the date rejection becomes effective until
the expiration date of the old contract.
20. § 88(c); House REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. For the status of administration ex-
penses, see note 3 supra.
21. Since all secured creditors must be paid in full before unsecured creditors recover
anything, § 94(b)(l); House REPORT, supra note 2, at 32, it is unlikely that the union
would recover the full amount of its damage claim under the plan.
22. House REPORT, sUpra note 2, at 17. The SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, is mute
on this issue, as it is on most aspects of the rejection of executory contracts. The
CoNFrr\ecLt REPORT, supra note 2, and the subsequent Senate floor debate, p. 968 &
note 64 infra, also are silent.
23. See note 6 supra.
24. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
25. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 7, 3.23[4] (Chap. X); 8 id. If 3.15[8] (Chap. XI). With
respect to executory contracts in general, courts rarely withhold approval for rejection;
the debtor's showing of onerousness need only be perfunctory.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 957, 1976
rejection, requiring a showing of a gTeater burden on the petitioner." ' ,
This standard, according to the House, is incorporated into revised
Chapter IX.
27
The contours of the judicial standard are derived by the House
Report from three Chapter XI decisions. In the earliest, In re Overseas
National Airways, Inc.,28 a federal district court noted that rejection
of a labor contract might deprive workers of intangible benefits such
as seniority, welfare, and pension rights and should be permitted
"only after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities
on both sides." 2 In Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel
Products, Inc.,30 the Second Circuit stated that the "decision to allow
rejection should not be based solely on whether it will improve the
financial status of the debtor" and that a bankruptcy court must "move
cautiously" in allowing such rejection; it specifically endorsed the
balancing test of Overseas National Airways.31 This endorsement was
repeated one month later in Brotherhood of Railway Employees v.
REA Express, Inc., 32 which follows closely the reasoning and con-
clusions of Kevin Steel.
33
The three opinions agree basically on the test a court should apply
in considering rejection of a labor contract,3 4 and the House Report
26. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
27. Id.
28. 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
29. [T]he Bankruptcy Court, when it has the power to reject a collective bargaining
agreement, should do so only after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the
equities on both sides, for, in relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the employees affected of their
seniority, welfare and pension rights, as well as other valuable benefits which are
incapable of forming the basis of a provable claim for money damages. That would
leave the employees without compensation for their losses, at the same time enabling
the debtor, at the expense of the employees, to consummate what may be a more
favorable plan of arrangement with its other creditors.
Id. at 361-62 (emphasis in original).
30. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
31. Id. at 707.
32. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
33. The REA court remanded a district court decision permitting rejection for
further findings to determine whether the labor contract was sufficiently onerous to
warrant rejection, acting "substantially for the reasons stated in remanding Kevin
Steel." Id. at 172.
34. The REA court proffered what would seem the most rigorous test. The court
stated that rejection of a labor contract "should be authorized only where it clearly ap-
pears to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the [debtor]
will collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." Id. See 28 VAND. L.
REv. 1374, 1380 (1975) (approving REA's standard of allowing rejection "only when
rentention of the contract would prevent [the debtor's] survival"); In re Studio Lighting,
Inc., 2 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) r, 65,929 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1976) (petition to reject labor
contract in Chap. XI denied because contract was not shown to be so burdensome as to
prevent successful rehabilitation of debtor). Applied literally, the REA language would
preclude judicial approval of rejection of a labor contract in Chapter IX. The municipal
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correctly observes that this test requires the debtor to make "a showing
of greater burden" than in a nonlabor context.35 Yet the Report may
be misleading insofar as it implies that such balancing of the equities
will make rejection of municipal employee contracts extraordinarily
difficult. Although worker equities may be hard to counterbalance in
a Chapter XI arrangement of a private business, the outcome of the
balancing test in Chapter IX will often depend on a factually distinct
set of equities.
Chapter XI courts were concerned that rejection of labor contracts
would deprive current employees of pension benefits and other in-
tangible rights.30 At least as to pensions, the courts' concern seems
unwarranted in Chapter IX. Admittedly losses from the rejection of a
pension plan are contingent and unliquidated, since the losses will
depend on the number of retirees and the pension level prevailing
at the time of their retirement. For this reason claims for such
losses might not be allowed and therefore would not share in the
distribution of the debtor's funds under the plan in Chapter XI.3 7
Though contingent or unliquidated claims which have been proven
debtor can neither collapse nor be thrown into liquidation. In Chapter IX, therefore,
the REA language is of questionable utility, except as suggesting a stricter test than
Overseas National Airways and Kevin Steel appear to require.
The factual contexts of Kevin Steel and Overseas National Airways obscure somewhat
the relative weights those panels would accord worker and debtor interests. In Kevin
Steel, the debtor's prior unfair labor practices suggested that its Chapter XI petition
may have been filed in bad faith as an attempt to rid itself of the union. 519 F.2d at
707. In Overseas National Airways, the court found the debtor's evidence of the burden-
some nature of the contract inaccurate and unconvincing. 238 F. Supp. at 361. Although
the case clearly requires a rigorous factual demonstration of the advantages of rejection,
its disapproval of the particular rejection under review did not dispute the substantive
standard of onerousness applied by the bankruptcy referee. Moreover, the discussion of
rejection standards has the air of dictum: the court held that §§ 1, 2, 76, 201-205 of
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 156, 181-185 (1970), and § 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970), precluded any unilateral change of employment
terms by the employer.
35. HoUsE REFPORT, supra note 2, at 17. But see In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp.
83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (no differentiation in treatment of collective bargaining and other
executory contracts); Note, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REV.
477, 478-81 (1969).
36. Brotherhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Shopmen's Local Union No.
455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975). As to In re Overseas
National Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), see note 29 supra.
37. See the proviso to § 57(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970):
[Ain unliquidated or contingent claim shall not be allowed unless liquidated or the
amount thereof estimated in the manner and within the time directed by the court;
and such claim shall not be allowed if the court shall determine that it is not
capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation or that such liquidation or estima-
tion would unduly delay the administration of the estate or any proceeding under
this title.
Section 57(d) is applicable to Chapter XI by virtue of §§ 371, 17, and 63(d), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 771, 35, 103(d) (1970). See note 38 infra.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 957, 1976
but not allowed are not discharged by confirmation of a Chapter XI
arrangement, 38 the workers' surviving claims could prove worthless
if the debtor subsequently collapses and goes out of business. Workers
thus might never be compensated for their losses. This inequity is
less likely in Chapter IX. First, the danger that surviving claims39 will
become worthless is negligible, for the debtor must continue to operate
and cannot be liquidated; in that sense, a municipality, unlike a
private company, cannot become judgment-proof. Moreover, almost
all municipal employees participate in state or local retirement sys-
tems.40 Pension benefits due these workers for past years' completed
service are generally fixed by statute,41 with employer contributions to
the systems prescribed by state or municipal law. 42 Rejection of collec-
tive bargaining contracts thus will usually have no effect on the ac-
crued pension rights of municipal employees. 43 (Admittedly the loss of
38. Bankruptcy Act §§ 371, 17, 63(d), 11 U.S.C. §§ 771, 35, 103(d) (1970); 9 COLLIER,
supra note 7, 7.10[2], at 57 n.8; id. 9.32[l], at 397-98. Section 371 provides that the
discharge of a debtor in Chapter XI excludes debts not dischargeable under § 17; the
latter section in turn provides that only provable debts are dischargeable. Section 63(d)
states that any contingent or unliquidated claim which has been proved under § 57(d) but
not allowed "shall not be deemed provable under this Act." Thus, contingent or
unliquidated claims that are proven but unallowed are not discharged in Chapter XL,
39. In revised Chapter IX, the judge has the express power to except a claim from
the general discharge of the debtor's obligations. § 95(b)(2)(A). All other claims are
discharged except those whose holders had no timely notice or knowledge of the
proceedings. In Chapter IX, unlike Chapter XI, claims that are proven but unallowed
are discharged unless specifically excepted by the judge. See § 81(1).
40. See T. BLEAKNEY, RETIREMENT SYsTEMS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 11-12 (1972); TAx
FOUNDATION, INC., STATE AND LOCAL EMI'LOYEE PENSION SYSTEMS 9-11 (1969); R. TILOVE,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FuNDs 5-7 (1976).
41. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:16A-5 to 43:16A-7 (Supp. 1976-1977) (police and fire-
men); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ B3-36.0 to B3-36.6 (1971) (New York City Employees
Retirement System). Currently, municipal employee pension benefits are rarely set by
collective bargaining. See R. TILOVE, supra note 40, at 251. Even where state law allows
collective bargaining over pension benefits, negotiated benefit rates generally do not
become effective until they are enacted into law by the legislature. Id. at 251-52.
42. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16-5 (1975) (police and firemen); N.Y. CITY ADMIN.
CODE §§ B3-17.0 to B3-19.0 (1971) (New York City Employees Retirement System).
43. In a number of states, including New York, Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts,
municipal employee pension rights are deemed contractual rights which may not be
diminished or impaired. R. TILOvW, supra note 40, at 253-56. In New York, this result
was achieved by constitutional amendment. N.Y. CO,-ST. art. V, § 7. Once enacted into
law, these "benefit rights, whether accrued for service completed or yet to be accrued on
future service, may not [so far as state law is concerned] be diminished for anyone who
is already a member of the system. Less advantageous benefits may be enacted only for
persons who are hired or who become members after the date of the change." R.
TILOVE, supra note 40, at 253-54.
Although the bankruptcy power permits Congress to impair contracts, subject to the
constraints of due process, any intent to preempt state pension laws, at least witl
respect to workers whose pension benefits have vested, was specifically eschewed in the
legislative debate over revised Chapter IX. 122 CONG. REc. S4376 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976)
(Sens. Javits and Burdick); see 122 CONG. REC. H2381-84 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976) (Rep.
Badillo). In addition, where benefit rights have accrued for service already completed,
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other intangible rights, such as seniority provisions, beneficial working
conditions, and certain protections against lay-off remain valid
equities.)
44
Equities in favor of the city in Chapter IX will be far more com-
pelling than the equities in favor of the employer in Chapter XI.
Onerous employment obligations may prevent a city from balancing
its budget for some time. The prospect of an unbalanced budget may
preclude judicial confirmation of the plan.4 5 Unless a city can reject
its labor contracts, lack of funds may force cutbacks in police, fire,
sanitation, and welfare services, imposing hardships on many citi-
zens.40 In addition, because cities in the past have often seemed im-
mune to the constraint of "profitability" faced by private businesses,
their wage contracts may be relatively more onerous than those in the
private sector.
47
B. The Consequences of Rejection
Ordinarily, when a municipal debtor rejects an executory contract
other than a collective bargaining agreement, the contractual relation-
the "contract" guaranteeing the pension payments is no longer truly executory, even by
the broad definitions of the SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, and HousE REPORT, supra note
2 (Supplemental Views).
44. In this respect, "worker equities" in Chapter IX would be similar to those in
Chapter XI. Yet Chapter XI courts may not be correct in assuming that claims for these
losses cannot be estimated and allowed. Presumably, labor and management are able to
appraise intangible benefits at the bargaining table. See L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS
AND LABOR RELATIONS 411, 423-24 (5th ed. 1970); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS 32 (1968).
45. S. 2597, supra note 2, § 817(c)(7), required evidence that the city's budget would
be balanced "within a reasonable time" as a precondition to confirmation. The Con-
ference version of H.R. 10624, supra note 2, now the present Act, eliminated this
express requirement. Yet the CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 21, states that "the
Senate's balanced budget requirement will be a factor that must be considered by the
court as part of the court's determination that the plan is 'fair and equitable and
feasible.'" Accord, 122 CONG. REC. S4377 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976) (Sen. Hruska). Budget-
balancing is not required in Chapter X and XI proceedings. See HoUsE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 59-60 (Supplemental Views).
46. Public interest considerations are usually less compelling in Chapters X and XI.
If a corporate debtor is forced to curtail operations, consumers can turn to substitute
products or services. Generally, no substitutes exist for the services that municipal
governments provide. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES
18-19, 30, 194-95 (1971). When substitutes for municipal services do exist (e.g., private
security protection or garbage collection), they are rarely accessible to lower income
citizens.
47. See id. at 16-17, 19-20, 25-26. In determining the onerousness of a labor contract,
the court would consider such factors as "featherbedding" provisions which prevent the
city from utilizing its manpower efficiently, a wide disparity between wage scales con-
tained in the contract and those prevailing in cities of similar size and cost of living,
measurably lower worker productivity of municipal employees as compared with
similarly paid private sector workers, and preeminently, the financial ability of the
city to maintain the required level of services.
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ship ends. The city elects to forego performance by the other party
rather than meet the terms of the contract. Municipal labor agree-
ments require a different calculus. The city cannot do without police,
fire, and sanitation services and therefore cannot do without the em-
ployees responsible for providing them. The ongoing nature of the
employment relationship will usually require renegotiation of the
city's employment contracts.
48
But how that renegotiation is to be conducted is less than certain;
the new statute is silent on the consequences of rejection of a labor
contract, and the legislative history is ambiguous. The House Report
states that "renegotiation and formulation of a new contract would,
of course, have to be in accordance with applicable Federal, State or
municipal law.' 49 The phrase "applicable Federal law" has no clear
referent; the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which provides
for collective bargaining procedures in most industries,0° is by its terms
inapplicable to municipal employers.0 ' But many states52 and some
cities0 3 have passed public employee laws based substantially on the
NLRA, requiring municipal employers to bargain collectively with
employee representatives. According to the House Report, if state or
local law mandates the observance of certain collective bargaining
procedures when a contract expires, the municipal bankrupt must
follow those same procedures after a contract is rejected.54
In addition, according to the House Report, state law would govern
the wages and working conditions to be provided by the city during
the period between rejection of the contract and conclusion of the
bargaining process. Rejection would be treated as equivalent to the
48. See King, Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old and New; Chapter IX Rules, 50
Am. BANKR. L.J. 55, 62 (1976): "The obvious purpose [of rejecting a collective bargain-
ing contract under Chapter IX] is not to displace employees but rather to renegotiate a
more favorable or less burdensome agreement."
49. House REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
50. The NLRA, with stated exceptions, grants employees the right to organize and
bargain collectively in any industry affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§ 142, 157
(1970).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. IV 1974) ("The term 'employer' . . . shall not include
... any State or political subdivision thereof .... ") The House Report's reference to
"applicable Federal law" may possibly have been to the 1974 amendments to tlhe Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), recently struck down by the Supreme Court on Tenth
Amendment grounds. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). Those
amendments extended the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to most
state and municipal employees.
52. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-3510 (Vest 1966 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
7-467 to 7-477 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1975). Over
30 states have passed statutes giving public employees the right to organize and bargain
collectively with their employer. These statutes are indexed at LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
50,079-80 (1975).
53. E.g., N.Y. CiTY ADNIIN. CODE ch. 54 (1971 &- Supp. 1974).
54. House REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
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normal "termination" of a contract.:5 If state law required main-
tenance of existing terms and conditions of employment during an
interim period after expiration of a terminated contract, the same
state termination provision would apply after rejection. 0 Such respect
for state law is said to be mandated by § 83 of the Act, which exercises
constitutional caution by declaring that "[n]othing in this chapter
shall be construed to limit or impair the power of any State to control,
by legislation or otherwise, any municipality or any political sub-
division of or in such State in the exercise of its political or govern-
mental powers .... ,,57
Several members of the House Judiciary Committee issued Supple-
mental Views' s to accompany the House Report. In contrast to the
majority Report, the Supplemental Views argue that the revised
Chapter IX is intended to override both state termination provisions
and state collective bargaining procedures50 Where a municipality has
55. Termination is the process by which one party to a collective agreement notifies
the other of its desire that the existing contract not be renewed.
56. The phrase "state termination provisions" will be used to refer to provisions of
state law which bar a municipal employer's unilateral alteration of employment terms.
These provisions are quite varied. Several state statutes contain termination provisions
modeled on § 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. IN' 1974), which requires that
a party desiring to terminate or modify a collective agreement give the other party 60
(lays notice, offer to meet and confer, and continue the terms and conditions of the
existing contract for 60 days after notice or until the contract's expiration date, which-
ever is later. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 663.165(1) (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1621(e)
(1975); W. VA. CoDE § 21-IA-4(d) (1973). Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-12(c) (Burns 1975)
(school emplo)ees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.07 (West Stipp. 1976) (industries affecting
public interest). Other state statutes have no express termination provisions, but make
an employer's unilateral alteration of employment terms an unfair labor practice. E.g.,
COLO. Rrv. STAvT. § 8-3-108(1)(f0 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-13(8) (Supp. 1974); KAN.
StAr. § .14-809(15) (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:5(I)(h) (1975).
57. § 83. According to the HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9, state termination
provisions represent an exercise of the state's "governmental function" and therefore
must be respected:
A rejection would also be sufficiently similar to a termination of such a contract so
that again, applicable law, if any, would apply to the rights of the other contracting
party between rejection and conclusion of the bargaining process. For example, if
State or other applicable law requires maintenance of terms and conditions of
employment existing under a terminated or rejected contract, during the interim
period, that applicable law would apply under section 83 to a contract rejected under
the bill. That section does not permit Chapter IX to interfere with or derogate from
any State law ihat regulates the way in which municipalities may execute this
governmental function.
Accord, King, supra note 48, at 62.
58. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 57-62 (Supplemental Views).
59. Id. at 57-58. Under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2, Congress can
override state laws which conflict with its exercise of the bankruptcy power. E.g., In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929) (state law governing distribution of
insolvents' property and releasing of claims superseded by Bankruptcy Act); In re
Colonial Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 1975) (Bankruptcy Act overrides
"idiosyncrasies of local property laws"); Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966) (trust provisions of state law overridden); In re Hicks, 133 F.
739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905) (municipal ordinance requiring firemen to pay expenses under
penalty of discharge overridden in straight bankruptcy).
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specifically requested rejection of a contract, they argue, neither the
Constitution nor § 83 poses any impediment to overriding applicable
state labor laws. 60 The language of § 83 prohibiting interference with
"political or governmental powers" appeared in the old Chapter IX61
and was retained only through "reluctance to remove tested language
from existing law. '"" It was not intended to restrict the court's power
to permit rejection of labor contracts.63
Normally one might be inclined to disregard such minority views.
But the legislative history of Chapter IX is peculiarly confused. The
Senate and Conference Reports said nothing about either collective
bargaining procedures or termination provisions; one would have as-
sumed this was because they accepted the majority House Report. Yet
during floor debate before the Senate vote on the Conference bill, the
Senate managers suddenly manifested a different understanding, adopt-
ing in substance the position of the House minority. 64 There is no in-
60. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 58 (Supplemental Views).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 83(c), (i), 11 U.S.C. § 403(c), (i) (1970).
62. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 58 (Supplemental Views). The first municipal
bankruptcy legislation, Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 800, was declared uncon-
stitutional in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513
(1936), on grounds of infringing state sovereignty. Justice McReynolds, writing for the
Court, objected that if Congress could extend bankruptcy legislation to political sub-
divisions that voluntarily requested relief, it might similarly impose involuntary proceed.
ings on the states themselves. In addition, even if a state did give consent to a bankruptcy
proceeding, the giving of consent violated the contracts clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1; just as a state cannot directly impair the obligation of contracts, it "can[not] ac-
complish the same end by granting any permission necessary to enable Congress to do
so." 298 U.S. at 531. Four years later, with the retirement of Justices Sutherland and Van
DeVanter and with the beginning of the Court's new acquiescence toward economic
legislation, Ashton was largely overruled by United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938),
upholding as constitutional the 1937 revision of Chapter IX. In distinguishing Ashton,
the Bekins Court relied heavily on the Act's deference toward the exercise of govern-
mental powers by the states, id. at 49-52, even though similar statutory language had
been disregarded by the Ashton Court, see 298 U.S. at 526.
63. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 58 (Supplemental Views). A narrow construction
of the new § 83 might be supported by the interpretation accorded its predecessor. In
only one reported case since Ashton has a bankruptcy court's exercise of discretion been
found to interfere with a debtor's "political or governmental powers." Spellings v. Dewey,
122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941), held that a bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to
interfere with the election of commissioners for a drainage district, or to pass on the
validity of the election after it was held. However, § 83 is also properly regarded as a
safety clause inserted to prohibit any exercise of discretion which could lead to invalida-
tion of the Act.
64. 122 CONG. REC. S4377 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976):
Mr. HRUSKA. But, does not the House report imply that local laws, such as
those governing the negotiation and renegotiation of collective bargaining [agree-
ments], might apply in such a case?
Mr. BURDICK. I am familiar with the language to which you refer. To use an
example, it is my understanding that some States have laws which require the
negotiation or renegotiation in good faith of all collective bargaining agreements and
that during the period of negotiation and renegotiation the employees must remain
on their jobs at the same salaries, conditions and terms. It is the intent of this
legislation that any such laws should not be allowed to frustrate the purposes of
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dication that the House managers ever receded from the majority
position outlined in the House Report. 5
Both strands of legislative history lead to seemingly unsatisfactory
results. Under the interpretation of the majority House Report,
Chapter IX would preempt neither collective bargaining laws nor
termination provisions. Yet application of termination provisions after
rejection may impose severe hardships upon the city. Judicial approval
of rejection signifies that a labor contract is financially detrimental
and that the equities decidedly favor rejection. Judicial approval
recognizes the city's need for immediate relief. If the city is forced to
maintain the old contract terms during months of exhausting negotia-
tions, relief is postponed indefinitely. The new contract proposals may
be far less lucrative, causing the union to prolong negotiations to take
advantage of the mandatory continuation of the old contract terms.
The union's reluctance to reach a new agreement may seriously impede
the efforts of an insolvent municipality to expedite adjustment of its
debts. On the other hand, according to the Senate managers' remarks
and the House Supplemental Views, the statute would override state
collective bargaining laws as well as state termination provisions. This
would create a confused and inequitable situation. It is not clear how
long suspension of collective bargaining procedures would last,66 nor
how a city would structure negotiations if a bankruptcy court, out of
concern for the other creditors, objected to procedures the city might
deem essential, such as binding arbitration. 7 Further, the public
policies underlying federal and state collective bargaining laws are
fundamental;"" the position of the Senate managers and House
minority ignores these policies.
the bankruptcy proceedings.
Mr. BURDICK. . . . [I]t is the intent of the legislation that if a State has such
laws they would not apply to the petitioner negotiating or renegotiating any collec-
tive bargaining agreement during the bankruptcy proceedings.
65. What evidence can be gleaned from the House floor debate suggests the contrary.
In that debate, which took place in the early afternoon, several hours before the Senate
managers' apparent heresy, Representative Edwards stated: "[A]greement [in conference]
was reached in a remarkably short time. The differences between the two [House and
Senate] bills were technical in nature and narrow in scope." 122 CONG. REC. H2381
(daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976).
66. Senator Burdick stated that under the Act state labor laws "would not apply to
the petitioner negotiating or renegotiating any collective bargaining agreement during
the bankruptcy proceedings." 122 CoNG. REC. S4377 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976) (emphasis
added). Even if one adopts Senator Burdick's view that suspension of state labor laws
would last at least until confirmation of a plan of adjustment, there is no assurance that
a new contract would have been negotiated by that time.
67. In addition, state labor laws may accord the city certain protections in the
negotiating process, such as prohibition of union refusals to bargain.
68. See, eg., NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 700 (McKinney
1965); H. WELLINGTON, supra note 44, 41-46 (1968).
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A more workable result would be one which preserves a municipal
debtor's obligation to follow applicable collective bargaining pro-
cedures in renegotiating a rejected contract, yet which absolves the
city of any duty during renegotiation to maintain existing employ-
ment terms. A court construing Chapter IX might reach this result by
finding that Congress had intended to preempt state termination
provisions, but not state collective bargaining laws. Yet it is not easy
to see from a formal perspective how a court could comfortably adopt
such a potpourri interpretation of the legislative history. 9 As a matter
of constitutional prudence, moreover, preemption of state law should
not be lightly inferred in dealing with the traditional powers of state
and municipal government.70
69. Such an interpretation would require rejection of the House Report's position on
state termination provisions. Yet in construing statutes, Committee reports have been
"traditionally regarded as the most reliable of legislative evidence." Bishin, Tie Law
Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1965). What
treatment should be accorded the Senate managers' remarks is less clear. Statements made
by conferees to their respective Houses in explanation of conference agreements can be
"[olf comparable weight to committee reports," H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1267 (tent. ed. 1958). But in
this instance, the fact that both the Conference Report and the House managers in
reporting back were silent on the issue of preemption makes it difficult to lend much
weight to the Senate managers' comments.
Even by the criterion of statutory purpose, it is hard to rationalize how a court could
choose selectively from the views of the House Report and the Senate managers. By
imposing financial hardships on a municipal bankrupt, termination provisions conflict
with Chapter IX's objective of restoring cities to fiscal health. Yet an argument can be
made that collective bargaining enhances the union's negotiating position, leading to
protracted negotiations and inflated settlements which also may forestall a city's
financial recovery.
70. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976), which invalidated
the extension of FLSA minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state and
municipal employees on the ground that such regulation, though well within Congress's
commerce power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, invaded state sovereignty protected by the
Tenth Amendment:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their
governmental functions ....
96 S. Ct. at 2471. National League of Cities does not necessarily bar all attempts to
preempt state public employee legislation. The Court's opinion expressly reserved the
question whether Congressional powers other than the commerce power were as severely
limited by the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 2474 n.17. The Court also seemed to find, in
distinguishing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), that measures which lessen wage
expenses rather than increase them, and measures which are only temporarily imposed,
are less objectionable than the FLSA amendments at issue in National League of Cities.
96 S. Ct. at 2475.
In addition, one might argue that a municipality that files for relief under Chapter
IX and applies specifically for rejection of a labor contract is voluntarily seeking a
benefit which Congress can properly condition on the acceptance of regulatory measures
closely connected to the aid granted. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
330 U.S. 127, 144 (1947) ("The offer of benefits to a state by the United States de-
pendent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the general
welfare, is not unusual."); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482-83 (1923). A
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Two of the Chapter XI decisions discussed above suggest an ap-
proach by which Chapter IX may be implemented workably without
invoking direct preemption of state labor laws, and thus without
abandoning the position of the House Report. These cases considered
whether a corporate debtor wishing to reject a labor contract is sub-
ject to the termination provisions of the NLRA and Railway Labor
Act (RLA). In Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,
Inc.,71 the Second Circuit held that a bankrupt in Chapter X or XI is
not required by NLRA termination provisions to maintain the old
terms and conditions of employment after rejection because such a
debtor-in-possession or a trustee in bankruptcy is "not the same
entity as the pre-bankruptcy company."72
A new entity is created with its own rights and duties, subject to
the supervision of the bankruptcy court .... Until the debtor here
assumes the old agreement or makes a new one, it is not a "party"
under section 8(d) to any labor agreement with the union and
is simply not subject to the termination restrictions of the
section.7
3
The court suggested, however, that the new entity in Kevin Steel might
very well be obliged by the NLRA to bargain collectively, 74 like an
ordinary successor employer, 75 with the representative of a majority of
its employees.
In Brotherhood of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc.,76 the
Second Circuit similarly had to decide whether a bankrupt carrier, as
debtor-in-possession, was covered by the RLA's requirement that a
carrier adhere to the existing terms of an expired labor contract
pending negotiation of a new contract. The court determined that
municipality can file for relief under Chapter IX only if it is generally authorized to do
so by the state legislature, or if it has the approval of a governmental officer or agency
empowered by state law to authorize particular petitions. § 84. However, whether the
grant of relief under an exclusive federal power such as bankruptcy can be likened to a
grant of federal revenues is open to question.
71. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
72. Id. at 704 (emphasis in original).
73. Id.
74. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively. NLRA § 2(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1), (2)
(1970), defines "employer" to include corporations, trustees in bankruptcy, and receivers.
75. "It may be that the obligations of such a trustee [in Chapter X or in straight
bankruptcy] or debtor [in Chapter X or XI] are analogous to those of a successor em-
ployer ...... 519 F.2d at 704. The original successor employer case, NLRB v. Burns
Security Seris., 406 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1972), held that the purchaser of a business who
hires a majority of the old employees is obliged under NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
1 58(a)(5) (1970), to bargain with a previous recently certified bargaining agent.
76. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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the debtor was a "new employer" and therefore was "not bound to
follow the elaborate and protracted procedures of [the RLA] before
putting into effect its proposed terms of employment."77 It was es-
sential that the debtor be permitted "to act promptly, albeit unilater-
ally, in avoiding onerous employment terms that will prevent it from
continuing as a going concern. ' '7 8 But again the debtor was obliged as
a successor employer to negotiate with the old bargaining representa-
tive of its employees. 9
This reasoning may permit a workable result under Chapter IX
without any finding of preemption. If a state has a statute requiring
collective bargaining, it seems likely that state courts will find a con-
tinuing obligation to bargain on the part of both debtors-in-possession
and successor employers-as a matter of state labor policy rather than
federal labor or bankruptcy law. Even without a successor employer
doctrine, state labor laws covering public employees may require
bankrupt municipalities in Chapter IX to bargain with the old
municipal union.
8 0
Termination provisions are another matter. If a state follows the
successor employer doctrine with respect to private businesses, it seems
likely that a city in Chapter IX would escape coverage under state
termination provisions within the terms of state labor law itself.
For if under state law a company that has purchased the assets of
another company is deemed a new employer, and therefore not obliged
to continue the original contract terms,81 a debtor-in-possession would
most likely be deemed a new entity as well.8 2 And if a private debtor-
77. Id. at 171.
78. Id. at 170-71.
79. Id. at 170, 171.
80. Municipal employee bargaining laws generally require that "public employers"
bargain collectively with employee representatives. A city in Chapter IX would remain
a "public employer" as defined by these laws and continue under a prospective duty
to bargain. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 201(6) (McKinney 1973).
81. It is a general rule of state law that a purchaser of assets is not liable for the
contract obligations of the seller unless he expressly or implicitly assumes those obliga-
tions. 15 IV. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (1973).
This rule applies to obligations under collective bargaining contracts. E.g., International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Shawnee Indus., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 347, 351-52 (W.D. Okla. 1963);
Carouso v. Empire Case Goods Co., 271 App. Div. 149, 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1946), a!ff'd, 297
N.Y. 514, 74 N.E.2d 462 (1947); In re Swift & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1947); In-
ternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 328 S.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. Tex.
1959). The rule governing liability of asset purchasers contrasts with the general rule of
state law governing the liability of merged or consolidated companies. A corporation
resulting from a merger or consolidation is generally liable for the contract obligations
of the constituent corporations, including obligations under collective bargaining con-
tracts. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra § 7121; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543
(1964); Fitzsimmons v. Western Airlines, Inc., 290 A.2d 682 (Del. Ch. 1972).
82. Like an asset purchaser, and unlike a merged company, a debtor-in-possession
assumes an independent financial identity with respect to general commercial debts
and obligations. It would be anomalous, as a matter of state law, to extend this in-
dependence to labor contracts in the case of asset purchasers but not debtors-in-possession.
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in-possession is deemed a "new entity" under state law, so should
a city that has taken on a new identity for most financial purposes
under Chapter IX.83 By the same logic that Chapter XI courts have
used to construe federal termination provisions as inapplicable to
corporate bankrupts, state courtss4 might faithfully construe state ter-
mination provisions as inapplicable to municipal bankrupts in Chap-
ter IX.8 State law would then present no bar to a city's unilateral
alteration of employment terms after rejection. The institution of
revised terms would grant the city immediate relief from onerous em-
ployment obligations. If the union were dissatisfied with the interim
terms, it could exercise any right it possesses under state law to strike"6
83. The analogy between a private debtor and a municipality as new entities is not
so difficult as it might seem. Since Chapter XI effects no change in equity ownership,
the characterization of a private debtor-in-possession as a new entity in Kevin Steel and
RfEA did not rely on any notion of a change in beneficial interest.
84. Because filing of a Chapter IX petition normally stays all actions against a city
until the proceeding is closed, § 85(e)(2), it is unlikely that state courts will often have
occasion to address the applicability of state termination statutes to municipal bank-
rupts. Consequently, the federal court "must exercise its independent judgment as to
what the [state] statute means, guided by analogous decisions, if any, and the court's
own reasoning as to the intended public policy." IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE ff 0.309(2)
(2d ed. 1974). However, several states now have statutes or rules permitting certification
of questions of state law to the state's highest court. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 710 & nn.2 & 4 (1973).
85. In construing state termination provisions, a state court might consider several
factors: (1) When the provisions were enacted, rejection of municipal employee contracts
under Chapter IX was not permitted. The state legislature could not easily have
anticipated that termination provisions might be applied to municipalities in bankruptcy
and thus had no occasion to provide an express exception. (2) Before a municipality can
seek relief under Chapter IX, the state must consent. § 84. Consent indicates the state
legislature's desire that the city be financially rehabilitated in successful fashion under
Chapter IX.
86. The city's unilateral alteration of employment terms undoubtedly would con-
stitute a breach of contract under state labor law, as it does under Chapter IX. See
§ 88(c). The city's breach would give the union the right to treat the contract as
terminated. In the absence of state antistrike laws, there would be nothing to prevent
the workers from leaving their jobs in concert. Most states, however, have passed statutes
prohibiting strikes by municipal employees. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-475 (1975); MicH.
CoMP. LA'WS ANN. § 423.202 (1967); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973); OHio
REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1973). If the municipality's unilateral alteration of
terms prompted a strike in defiance of such statutes, the federal bankruptcy court
(though not the state courts) would be powerless to stop it. Federal courts are prohibited
by the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970), from enjoining any "refusal
to perform work or remain in any relation of employment in cases involving any labor
dispute." (Section 85(e)(4) gives a Chapter IX court broad powers to enjoin any "act or
proceeding" against the city. Although this language could not easily be construed to
permit injunctions against strikes, the HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23, records in a
burst of caution that the "breadth of this provision is not intended to overrule other,
specific Federal legislation that prohibits Federal courts from issuing injunctions, such
as the Norris-La Guardia Act." The House's assumption that the Norris-La Guardia Act
applies to federal courts sitting in bankruptcy is most probably correct. See 6 COLLIER,
supra note 7, 3.09[1], at 479-81 n.17.)
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and otherwise would seek to conclude a new agreement as quickly as
possible, facilitating an expeditious adjustment of the city's debts. 
7
The apparent assumption in the House Report that state law would
require a city to maintain the old contractual terms after rejection is
thus ill-considered. It overlooks the possibility that state law will be
interpreted by state courts harmoniously with analogous federal labor
law governing employers in the private sector. The power to reject
labor contracts in municipal bankruptcy is best given practical effect
without implicating difficult questions of preemption.
87. When a municipality requests permission to reject a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the court might require a statement of the revised employment terms that the
city proposes to establish after rejection. The court could consider the fairness of pro.
posed changes in light of their impact on the city, its workers, its other creditors, and
the public. See Leibowitz, Municipal Bankruptcy, N.Y.L.J., June 29, 1976, at 2, col. 2.
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